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Abstract: Stu&es have detailed the detrimental effects of natural resources on govemance Much of the stu&es 
have gained prominence via the resource curse thesis. Though, the thesis arguments might be convincing yet 
there are notable exceptions of resource endowed countries that have avoided the resource curse &lemma. 
What then dstinguishes losers from winners when it comes to resource wealth management? Is the curse that 
of resource or imtitutions? This study seeks to analysis the crisis of resource rent mis-governance in Angola, 
the second most important oil producing country in sub-Saharan Africa. The study looks at the mismanagement 
of the ever increasing rents from oil by the d i n g  elite and the general governance crisis in post-war Angola. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The effects of natural resources extraction and 
production on the ecology, economy and govemance in 
sub-Saharan African states remaim a central discourse in 
academic and policy circles within and outside the 
continent. Without doubt natural resources play an 
impodant role in the politics and economy of most 
resources endowed states within the continent and across 
the globe. They are not just the dominant commodities 
that states rely on in international trade in most instances 
revenue from their production and extraction related 
activities bankroll d i n g  regimes. Contrary to expectation 
that resource abundance will aid economic growth and 
development the reverse has been the case particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Numerous studies have indeed 
obsenred that resource rich countries tend to record 
abysmal economic performance contrary to popular 
expectation (Sach and Warner, 1995, 1997, 2001). The 
manner by which rent from natural resource extraction 
spurned negative economic growth, aid comption and 
ginger rent-seeking behaviour has been explained via the 
resource curse thesis. 
Notwithstanding the negativities that have come to 
be associated with natural resources in p d c u l a r  oil in 
extant literature, experience has shown that the curse of 
resources' do notjust materialize over night. Indeed, there 
are pocket of resource endowed states that have 
prudently managed their resource wealth in ways that it 
has promote economic growth and enhance national 
development thus avoidng the resource curse &lemma. 
Whether the curse associated with resource abundance 
materialize and the manner in which it does, often depend 
on complex set of context conditiom that are peculiar to 
a given resource endowed state (Basedau, 2005). Rather 
than been a curse in itself the dscove~y of natural 
resource often study to aggravates existing governance 
problems that predate the ascendancy of resource 
extractive sector and the years of resource boom. 
Given t h ~ s  premise, this study seeks to &scuss the 
ways by whchmassive oil rent in the context of weak mle 
of law and governance institutions has failed to tramlate 
to improved standard of living for millions of Angolans, 
worsen the crisis of comption, strengthen autocratic 
political tendencies, undermine competitive electoral 
politics and ginger political instability in Angola as is the 
case in other sub-Sahara Africa oil states. The study 
makes extensive use of briefing papers and r e p o a  from 
academic and policy advocacy institutions in and outside 
the continent to illuminate the numerous governance 
challenges emanating from the mis-management of 
resource rents in paJticular oil rent in Angola. Its analysis 
was also informed by information in peer-review journal 
adicles, books, opinion piece, commentaries and other 
related information. The study is organized into sections. 
Following this introduction is the &scussion of 
theoretical views that have come to dominate the 
discourse on resource rent, governance crisis and 
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associated challenges in resources endowed developing 
economies. The objective is to situate the challenges of 
oil governance in Angola within a theoretical frame. 
Ths  is followed by the &scussion of the centrality of 
the oil industq to Angola's post war economic recovery 
and the pivotal role of oil rents to annual government 
revenue. The studv then discusses the mis-eovernance of - 
oil rents by the ~uling elite and the crisis of comption in 
Angola. It hghlights how the availability of massive oil 
rents has given the mling elite the m e m  to undermine 
the democratic process and continued political imtability 
in Angola. It then assess policy options that are been 
implemented for navigating the resource curse crisis in 
sub-Sahara Africa oil producing states. The study 
conclude by affirming that the path to exiting the resource 
curse dilemma is for civil society groups and the people of 
the sub-region oil states to vigorously monitor and 
demands accountability and transparency in resource 
governance in paJticular and state governance in general. 
Curse by resource or institution: A theoretical 
discourse: Prior to the late 1980's, the popular view among 
maimtream economists on the relatiomhp between 
natural resource endowment and development was that 
resource abundance largely aid development. T h s  
position has however, come under vigorous challenge, 
since the late 1980's given obsenred slow growth and 
development stagnation in richly endowed and resource 
dependent economies. The current position in the 
literature on resource-development llnk now is that natural 
resource abundance (in paJticular oil) increase the 
lkelihood that countries might experience poor economic 
performance, democratic retrogression, rent seeking and 
political imtability (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Ross, 
2004a; Sach and Wamer, 2001). The negativities that have 
come to be associated with resource abundance in 
padicular oil has come to be expressed through the 
resource curse thesis. 
The central plank of the resource curse theory that 
countries rich in natural resources tend to perform badly 
in economic term has been shown empirically and 
analyzed in number of econometric studies. Mineral 
dependent economies experienced a more serious 
deterioration in the efficiency of domestic capital 
formation than non-mineral dependent economies in the 
boom years of 1971-1983 resulting in negative growth 
(Auty, 1993; Gelb, 1988). Sach and Wamer (1995, 1997) 
examined the experiences of a large and &verse set of 
natural resource economies between 1970 and 1989 their 
conclusion was that natural resource abundance was 
negatively correlated with economic growth. T h s  
corroborated earlier conclusion of Wheeler (1 984) study. 
In a latter study, Sach and Wamer (2001), note that the 
slow growth rate associated with resource abundant 
economies is not easily explained by other variables or by 
alternative ways to measure resource abundance. 
Studies have also established the fact that natural 
resource abundance is closely associated with the omet, 
duration and intensity of civil war. Examining the 
experiences of 98 countries and 27 civil wars, Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998) found that natural resource abundance, 
defined in terms of the ratio of primary expo& to GDP is 
a strong determinant of the omet of civil war. Using better 
set of data they confirmed their earlier fin&ng in 
subsequent studies (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Using 
thideen countries recent civil wars as case study, Ross 
(2004a) affirmed that cedain types of natural resources 
(oil, gemstones and dmgs) have indeed influenced the 
onset and duration of civil wars. 
In an earlier study using pooled time series 
cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 
1997, Ross (2001) arrived at the conclusion that the 
oil-impedes-democracy claim is both valid and statistically 
robust. The study concludes that a state's reliance on oil 
or mineral expods tends to make it less democratic and 
that this effect is not limited to a paJticular geographical 
enclave, a conclusion that was later corroborated by 
Jensen and Wantchekon (2004). Ross (2004b, 2006) in a 
latter study that makes use of improved measures of 
hydrocarbon and &amond production arrived at the 
conclusion that there is strong evidence that resource 
wealth has made conflict more lkely to occur, last longer 
and produces more casualties when it does occur. 
Though informed by statistical evidence, studies 
have challenged many of the assumptions and 
conclusions of the mainstream econometric resource 
curse explanation. Using new measure of natural 
resource wealth, a cross-country estimation study by 
Bmumchweiler (2008) established a positive &rect 
association between resource abundance and economic 
growth over the period 1970-2000. In the same vein, 
Basedau (2005) has earlier argued that the resource curse 
thesis fails to sufficiently explain why and how several 
countries have not or only paJtly been affected by the 
curse. Basedau (2005) thus, noted that whether or not 
natural resource are detrimental to a country's 
socio-economic and political development depends on a 
number of contextual variables, &vided into c o u n t y  
specific andresource-specific conditions (Basedau, 2005). 
On the resource rent-conflict linkage, Obi (2009) notes 
that the resource curse thesis failed to capture the 
complex dimemions of the politics and international 
linkages that underpin violent conflicts in resource rich 
Ahcan  countries. Such criticism re-affked the position 
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of Mahler (2010) that resource wealth in this imtance oil 
should not be view as the major cause of violence in oil 
endowed states. But rather, contextual condtiom as 
political-imtitutional and socio-economic weakness that 
existed even before the resource boom era are major 
factors predsposing oil endowed states to political 
violence while other autonomous factors induced by the 
logic of oil rent politics also influence the dynamics of 
conflict in oil dependent African states. 
Natural resource dependent countries comtitute both 
growth losers and growth winners, the major factor 
differentiating success cases from those of failure been 
the quality of institutions. Countries with bad imtitutions 
suffer double tragedy of the resource curse as the 
deterioration of institutiom strengthens the negative 
effects of more natural resources note (Mehlum et al., 
2005). Espousing the political and institutional inclined 
explanation of the curse of resource thesis is the Rentier 
State Theory variant. 
The Rentier State Theory is a complex of ideas 
concerning the pattern of development, policy decisions 
and the nature of states in economies dominated by 
external rent particularly oil rents. The theory of the rentier 
state analysis of oil economies of the Gulf of Guinea staJts 
from the perspective of the key financial resource oil rent 
and explores the social forces of production and power 
structures that emerge out of it, through the creation of a 
rentier class that monopolizes wealth and political power, 
the effects on political imtitutions and policies making to 
the cultivation of rentier mentality that breaks the causal 
hnks between work and rewards (Yates, 1996). 
The most important concept in the theory rent is a 
medieval economic term that describes an annual income 
levied under feudal law on property alienated from its 
landlord. Reading of political science literature of rentier 
state thesis indicates three points of agreement on the 
issue of rent. In delineating a rentier economy Beblawi 
(1987) listed four condtions that need to be present. First, 
a rentier economy must be one where rent situations 
predominates; the origin of the rent must be external to 
the economy; only the few must be engaged in the 
generation processes of the rent and lastly the 
government must be the primary recipient of the rent 
(Genrasoni, 2009; Beblawi, 1987). 
The term rentier state refers to any state that lives on 
such unearned income arising from oil production and 
related activities. Dependence on petroleum revenue 
prevalent in oil producing economies produces a 
distinctive type of institutional setting, the petro-state 
which encourages the political distribution of rents 
(distributive) rather than laying a solid foundation for 
enhancing the productive capacity of the economy. 
Such a state is characterized by fiscal reliance on 
petrodollars whch expands state jurisdiction and weakens 
authority as other productive (inclusive of extractive) 
capabilities whther. 
As a result when faced with competing pressures, 
state officials become habituated to relying on the 
progressive substitution of public spendng for statecraft, 
thereby fiuther weakening state capacity. State attempts 
to support the non-extractive sectors through subsidies 
often prove mustainable as they mostly failed to 
address long term competitiveness while the benefit of 
subsidies are often lost to corruption through the system 
complex web of patronage and rent-seeking practices 
(Karl, 1997). 
The cormption of state institutiom is often 
compounded by series of faulty monetary and fiscal 
policies that often lead to the staking up of national debt 
agaimt future resource rents (oil back loam). 
Deriving from the condtiom underlying analysis of 
the rentier state theory is that when states gain a large 
proportion of their revenues from external sources, 
pahcularly resource rents and royalties this reduce the 
needs for political leaders to levy domestic taxes. The 
relegation of the need for domestic taxation for the 
running of the affairs of the state makes political leaders 
to be less accountable to individuals and groups within 
their states. 
This result in the no representation without taxation 
dilemma on which studes that argued that oil rent 
impedes democratization build upon noted (Herb, 2005). 
Resource rents according to the rentier thesis provide 
ruling elite with a classic means for staying in power by 
establishing an organized system of patronage in whch  
oil rents is use to reward followers and punish regime's 
opponents. Imtitutional arrangements and client list 
networks linked to the resource sector thus shape the 
matrix of power politics. 
This was p d c u l a r  the case in Nigeria, Angola and 
Eauatorial Guinea where the national oil cornorations are 
central to the patronage and clientelist networks of ~uling 
regimes and the national power politics. By undermining 
the need for broad base taxation, oil rents 
correspondngly undermine the ability and willingness of 
the citizemy to demands accountability and tramparency 
in state governance from mling regime. 
Fiuther groundng the dscussion of the resource 
curse in the dynamics of politics and moving away from 
the econometric deterministic explanation was the 
position of Robinson et a1 (2006) that the political 
incentives that resource endowments generate are the key 
to understanding whether or not they are a curse. Their 
study build explicitly political model of resource extraction 
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based on patronage to investigate the types of political 
incentives triggered by resource booms and their adverse 
effects on development. They note that resource booms 
increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 
through the i n s t m e n t  of patronage deploys by politician 
to hold on to power. 
More than this, their major findng was that the 
overall impact of resource booms on a nation economy 
depends critically on institutions, since they determine 
the extent to which political incentives map into policy 
outcomes 
Thus, it can be safely argued that if resource booms 
create underdevelopment it cannot be because they 
induce inefficiency in the rate at which resources are 
extracted the reasoning been that inefficiency may well 
arise because of what politiciam do or failed to do with 
resource rents and the implicatiom of h s  on political 
institutiom and governance processes (Fig. 1). Figure 1 
is a diagrammatic representation of the resource- 
institutions-development divergence path among 
resource endowed states. Figure 1 shows that for 
resource endowed states with strong political and 
governance institutiom resource endowment often act as 
the catalyst for development did not impede 
democratization and resource related socio-political 
conflicts are resolved through imtitutionalized modalities 
acceptable to all. 
However in resources endowed states with weak 
political and governance institutions, resource rents often 
generates most of the imtitutional malades associated 
with resource rentierism). The impoIt of the discussion is 
to establish the position that a better understandings of 
the negative impacts of resource rent on national 
economies and politics will come from an explicit 
understanding of the incentives of politicians to extract 
resources efficiently and how the presence of resources 
impacts on the choice of policy imtmments. The most 
obvious explanation of the incidence and path of the 
(oil d k m d  and 
other precious 
resource curse is in understandng the complexity in the 
interaction between state institutiom and rent from 
resources extraction and the implicatiom of h s  on 
politics and public policies 
The place of oil in the economy of post-war Angola: 
Angola, Africa's foremost PoItuguese former colony is a 
country blessed with abundant stocks of natural 
resources of which oil and diamonds are the most 
pre-eminent. Revenue from c~ude-oil accounted for more 
than half of the country's gross domestic product and 
>90% of total expods making the oil industry the 
backbone of the Angolan economy and the most 
impoItant source of govemment revenue with a 
contribution of 80% (Bermudez-Lugo, 2009; Tvedten, 
2002). Angola joined the league of oil producing state in 
1955 when oil was discovered omhore in the Kwanza 
basin by Petrofina whch  together with the PoItuguese 
colonial administration established the jointly owned 
company, Fina Petroleos de Angola, Petroangol. The 
upstream sector of the Angolan oil industry witnessed 
dramatic expansion with the dscovery of major oil fields 
off the coast of the enclave of Cabinda by the Cabinda 
Gulf Oil Company, CABCOG and now Chevron Texaco. 
The establishment of the national oil corporation, 
Sonangol in 1976 marked the beginning of strong state 
involvement in the Angolan oil industry (World Bank, 
2006). In 1976, the govemment of Angola set up the 
Sociedade Nacionao de Combustiveis (Sonangol) and 
enacted a petroleum law, law 13/78 in 1978. Under h s  law, 
Sonangol was established as the exclusive concessionaire 
for oil exploration and development while being permitted 
to enter into associatiom with foreign companies to 
obtain the resource needed for oil exploration, 
development and production. The discove~y of massive 
deep-water offshore oil fields off the Angolan coast in 
recent years has made Angola to emerge as an impoItant 
player in the oil business in the Gulf of Guinea and in the 
Divasify emnomy, mnomio 
growth and developmen& Itsnspamd 
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Fig. 1: Resource rents, imtitutiom and governance; the divergence paths 
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Table 1: Angola oil production figure 1998-2008 
Production figure in thousand 
Years barrel day-' (000 bpd) 








British Petoleurn, BP Annual Statistical Data, 2008 
international arena. Angola's proved reserve has 
witnessed massive increase in the space of 3 decades. It 
was 2.0 billion barrel at the end of 1988 increas~ng to 
4.0 billion barrel at the end of 1998 and jumping to 
13.5 billion barrel at the end of 2007. According to the 
latest world energy review repod, Angola has the 2nd 
largest proved reserve in the Gulf of Guinea after Nigeria 
and stood at h r d  position behind Nigeria while Libya 
lead the pack in Africa (British Petroleum, 2009). 
Angola's level of daily production has quadmpled in 
the past 2 decades from an average of 280 000 barrel dayf 
in 1968 to approximately 1.42 million barrel day-' in 2006. 
According to projection, production is expected to 
continue rising in line with the discoveIy and operation of 
new oil fields off the Angola coast and in the Kwanza 
basin. As at the end of 2008, Angola daily production 
stood at 1.87 million barrel dayf resulting in an annual 
change over of 9.1% from the production figure of 2007 
and by the 2008 production figure Angola contribution 
to world total cmde-oil production stood at 2.3% 
(WorldBank, 2006; BntishPetroleum, 2009) (Table 1). The 
Angolan economy has witnessed rapid growth rate in 
recent years in line with rising oil production and revenue 
levels. 
The annual average growth rate of the economy 
stand at 16.8% between 2004 and 2008 but h s  was 
stalled by the fall in the world price of cmde-oil and the 
global economic recession. The country's GDP has also 
witnessed appreciable improvement rising from 
US$11 billion in 2002 to US$84.19 billion in 2008 
though it fell to US$70.60 billion in 2009. 
Central to h s  spectacular rise in national gross 
domestic product is the phenomenal growth in national oil 
production and development in the oil industry. 
Notwithstandmg the impressive statistics, the economy 
has not witnessed much diversification as it remains 
ove~whelmingly dependent on its oil sector which 
contributes on average around 50% to Angola's annual 
GDP (International Monetaq Fund 201 0). 
Table 2: Contribution of amiculture. industm and services to Angola 
national GDP at constant prices (2000 US$ million) 
Years Amiculbre Industq Services GDP (real price) 
1990 686 4.861 2.556 8.464 
2005 1,024 11,126 2,792 14,935 
Basic indicators and national accounts, the World Bank in 2008, 37-39 
While the end of decades' of civil war is expected to 
herald improvement in living standard however Angola's 
oil wealthhas materialized in little benefits for majority of 
Angolan (Table 2). 
The curse of resource: Oil rents mismanagement, 
corruption and conflicts in Angola: Since, the official end 
of the Angolan civil war in 2002, the nation has recorded 
spectacular rise in economic statistics. Oil and diamond 
production figure has shot up leading to appreciable rise 
in all indces of economic growth. Given a projected GDP 
per capita of US$4674 as at 2010, it will be wrong in 
relative tern to categorize Angola as a poor nation when 
compare with other countries within sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, the nation's resource wealth has failed to 
translate to improve living standard for it people as there 
is high prevalence of povem. Not only has povedy 
remains pervasive, the provision of basic social services 
by the government has been highly inadequate and failed 
to correlates with revenue accmble to the coffer of the 
state (Tvedten, 2002). Statistics has shown that Angola 
performance in tramforming it h g h  GDP per capita into 
basic welfare for its population has been woeful. 
Sub-Saharan African countries with less than half of 
Angola's GDP per capita have done better than Angola in 
human development index ranking in recent years. With 
a 0.564 HumanDevelopment Index (HDI), Angola ranked 
143 of 182 countries on the UNDP 2009 human 
development ranking whle Sao Tome and Principe with 
US$1,550 andcomoros withUS$1,143 GDP per capita has 
an HDI of 0.65 and 0.57, respectively far better and ahead 
of Angola with a higher GDP (US$5,385) per capita. 
Accordmg to available statistical data, the infant modality 
rate for Angola stand at 154 per 1,000 live b i h ,  one in 
four Angolan children &e before their fifth bihday, 90% 
of the country infant modality is attributable to malaria, 
diarrhea or resplratoIy tract infections, 53.7% of total 
b i h s  are not attended by skill health worker whle 
Angola's maternal momlity rate of 1,700 per 100,000 
births is one of the hghest in sub-Saharan Africa 
(ADB, 201 0; United Natiom Development Programme, 
2009; WorldBank, 2010). Other social statistical data for 
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Angola are not in any way encouraging. Approximately, 
70% of Angolan lives on <US$2 a day; 46% of the 
population was considered to be undernourished, 49% 
did not have access to an improved water source; 31% of 
children under 5 years are unde~weight for their age, half 
of the population did not have access to improved 
sanitation facilities, adult illiteracy rate stands at 32.6%, 
40.5% of the population lives below the national poveIty 
line, the probability of not sunriving to 40 years of age is 
38.5% whle life expectancy stand at 46.5 years (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2009). Angola human 
povem index value stands at 37.2% ranking 118 of 182 
countries in UNDP 2009 calculation; life expectancy index 
value stands at 0.359 while education index value stands 
at 0.667. 
In the same stead, the International Food Policy 
Research Institutes places Angola at 68 of 84 countries in 
the 2009 Global Hunger Index. These values did not 
correspond well with Angola's medum GDP value 
and the country's GDP index value that stands at 0.665 
(ADB, 2010). As shown by Table 3 on most health 
indcators core headings Angola's performance like that 
of other sub-Sahara Africa's oil producing states was 
poor given their level of oil wealth when compared with 
the performance of their non-oil producing peer w i h n  the 
sub-region with equivalent or less GDP per capita as 
highlighted in the 2009 UNDP human development repod 
(Table 3). 
The paradox of poverty in Angola is also reflected by 
the personal income distribution which is among the most 
unequal in the world. Angola's GIN1 coefficient whch 
measures income inequality is 62 compared to 55 in 
Congo, DR largely comidered a failed state. As an 
example of the skewed nature of wealth dstribution, the 
ten richest Angolan had fades that exceed US$100 
million whle another 49 had >US$50 million. Topping 
Angola's rich list is President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos 
himself, a parliamentary deputy, two officials in the 
president's office, an ambassador, a former m y  chef of 
staff and the minister of public works as repoIted in 
Angolense, a leading Luanda based newspaper. 
Thus, the seven richest Angolam were allgovernment 
functionaries (McMillan, 2005). The list shows the extent 
at which ~uling elite have diveIted public funds for 
personal enrichment leaving large percent of the 
population to live below the poveIty line. Indeed, the 
s to~y  of Angola presents a horrifying case of povem 
amidst riches and a glaring case of squandered 
possibilities. Tied to Angola's poor performance in human 
development, human poveIty and global hunger indexes 
is the crisis of mis-governance of Angola resource wealth 
and general mis-management of the economy. While the 
root causes of cormption in Angola are varied and 
complicated however the effects of rapacious behavior of 
political elite in fuelling cormption is comiderable. That 
the web of corruption staJts with the President his 
political clique and business cronies underscore the 
impacts of elite behavior in fuelllng official corruption and 
mis-governance (Witness, 1999). The bluned line between 
the mling p a ~ Q  the Popular Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola MPLA and the state reinforce the process of 
dubious business dealings and cormpt practices. The 
situation is worsened by the lack of judicial independence 
while the impunity this created work to strengthened 
official and unofficial cormption in all aspect of national 
economic management. 
Now here are the devastating effects of revenue 
misappropriation and state corruption more starkly 
illustrated than in Angola where the percent of children 
that will not live to see the age of 5 also correspond to the 
percent of revenue that went unaccounted for in state 
budget each year, one quarter as repoIted by Witness 
(2004). RepoIts have noted that the accounting of 
government's budget and expenditures has for long 
remaim opaque in Angola. R e p o a  has it that in the 
period between 1997-2002, 36% of government 
expenditure fell outside of legal procedures and were 
not recorded in official account whle on average 
US$703 million year? or around 10% of the country's 
GDP could be not be accounted for out rightly. Actual 
funds unaccounted for from 1997-2002 are in the range 
of US$4.22 billion. In those same years, total social 
spending in the country including Angola government 
spending as well as public and private initiatives funded 
Table 3: Basic health indicators of Sub-Sahara A6ica's oil vroducinx states 
Life expectancy Under 5 mortality Infant mortality Maternal mortality HIVIAIDS Tuberculosis incidence Death due to malaria 
Countries at birth (1.000) (1.000 live birth) (100.000 live birth) vrevalence (100.000vemle~ (100.000vemle~ 
Angola 46.5 260 154 1,700 3.7 269 354 
Cameroon 50.9 149 87 730 5.4 174 108 
Chad 48.6 208 124 1,100 3.5 272 207 
Congo Rep 53.5 108 81 510 5.3 367 78 
Equatorial 49.9 205 123 880 3.2 233 152 
Guinea 
Gabon 60.1 91 60 420 7.9 308 80 
Nigeria 47.7 194 100 800 3.9 283 141 
Sudan 57.9 90 62 590 1.6 228 70 
United Nations Human Development Report, 2009; World Bank in 2008 
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through the United Natiom Comolidated Inter-Agency 
Appeal came to $4.27 billion. In effect the Angolan 
govemment failed to account for an amount equal to the 
total amount spent on the humanitarian, social, health and 
education needs of a population in severe distress 
(Ng and Le Billon, 2007; Watch, 2004). 
Citing the KPMG's, 2002 oil &agnostic repod on 
Angola, Human Rights Watch provides lucid details of 
comption that characterized MPLA's led govemment 
management of Angola's oil wealth. The repod indcates 
that the extent of the mismanagement of oil wealth 
involves various forms of dscrepancies in the 
documentation of incoming oil revenue. The 
discrepancies in oil revenue occurred in areas of oil tax 
and royalty's revenue, Sonangol tax and royalty; 
Sonangol profit oil revenue and signature bonus payment 
(Watch, 2004). Massive dscrepancies also manifest in the 
documentation of oil production by multinational oil 
corporations and state owned oil company Sonangol. The 
mis-management of incoming oil revenue are not unique 
as the scale of mis-management of public expendture was 
also stunning. The IMF staff repod of 2002 repods that 
there are massive dscrepancies in govemment 
expenditure paJticularly in the area of defense 
spending. It attributes the loss of public fund to 
mis-management, govemment refusal to provide accurate 
information on all its expendtures and large scale official 
comption (International Monetaq Fund, 2002). In its 
earlier r epoa ,  Global Witness hghlighted the massive 
looting of state revenue in Angola under the watch of the 
~ullng MPLA regime. The reports note that the mechanism 
of misappropriation of revenue have included offshore 
money laundering, over priced militaq procurement and 
deliberate opaque method of ~unning up debts against 
future oil production (Witness, 1999, 2002). 
In all the Presidents Men Witness (2002) drew 
attention to Angolagate scandal showing how Angola's 
MPLA elite profited from and privatized the war with 
UNITA. The repod highlighted how members of President 
Dos Santos clique worked with associates in France, the 
US, Russia and Israel to skimmed huge sums from the 
Angolangovemment's militaq procurement process. The 
arms deals and the massive kickbacks that went with them 
were paid for by Angola's oil revenue. Angolagate as the 
arms-to-Angola scandal was referred to in the media 
shows the way that the Angolan's civil war provided a 
cover for full-scale looting of the country's oil wealth in 
the course of waging a war by national and international 
business and political elites across three continents 
(Witness, 2002) (Key figure implicated in the Angolagate 
scandal in France include Jean-Christophe Mitterrand and 
Jacques Attali, son and advisor of former French 
President Francois Mitterrand, respectively former French 
Interior Minister Charles Pascua and his right hand man 
Jean-Charles Marchiam. Other outside France include 
Arkad Gaidmak, former Brenco International boss Pierre 
Falcone among other prominent international business 
figure (Witness, 2002). 
The scandal not only provides a disturbing insight 
into Angola's oil wealth mismanagement in time of war it 
also raises concerns about the likelihood that such high 
level compt deals might exists in modified form in 
post-war Angola given lack of transparency and 
accountability in the way oil revenue continued to be 
managed. Confirming such fears, Witness (2004) 
analysis in details the shady arrangements surrounding 
the re-structhring and re-financing of Angola's numerous 
external debts. Indeed the repod notes that most of the 
debt re-financing deals were carried out via fresh loans 
backed by future oil production. 
Though, the urge to control resource wealth might 
not have being the immedate cause of the decades' long 
Angolan civil war however, revenue from Angola's 
mineral resource help to prolonged the conflict. Oil rents 
and proceeds from the sale of Blood Diamond allowed 
both the MPLA govemment and the UNITA rebel 
movement to wage a destructive civil war for 3 decades. 
The share of Angola's GDP spent on defense and 
security related issues during the twilight years of the war 
was repoded to be among the highest in the world, 
consuming on average 26% of the GDP till 1999. Repod 
also indicates that multinational oil corporations' 
practices of financing both pahes to the war also 
contribute to prolonging the conflict. In pdcu la r ,  French 
Elf Aquitaine was indicted for bankrolling p d e s  to the 
war in Angola (Ng and Le Billion, 2007; Witness, 2004; 
Watch, 2009). 
Whle  the death of Savimbi and the subsequent 
signing of the 2002 Luena Peace Accord brought the war 
to an end Angola still face a separatist imurgency in the 
oil rich enclave of Cabinda Highlighting the tenuous 
security situation in Cabinda was the ambush of Togolese 
contingent to the 2010 African Cup of Natiom in the 
province on the 8th of Januaq, 2010 by fighters 
belonging to the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of 
Cabinda, FLEC. The incident left three people dead and 
many inlured The success of the attack is an indication of 
the fiilure of Luanda policies of securing peace in oil rich 
Cabinda through exclusivist pact with factions of the 
rebelling group and militarization of Cabinda rather than 
an all inclusive peace negotiation that address the core 
grievances of the people of Cabinda against the Angolan 
state. Expectation that the peace accords with UNITA and 
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faction of FLEC in 2002 and 2006 will herald improved 
political atmosphere has failed to materialize. Members of 
opposition p d e s  continue to face harassment, 
intimidation and assault in the hands of state security 
agencies whle the meda  continue to operate under 
restrictive environment. Indeed, the MPLA govemment 
has taken maximuim advantage of the peace agreement 
with remnant of UNITA to enhance it political position 
and consolidate its hold on power. 
Ths  was evidence by its repoded manipulation of the 
electoral processes leading to the 2008 parliamentary 
election in whch  the p@ announced a resounding 
81.7% victory in the poll that translate to a 191 out of 
220 parliamentaq seats (Watch, 2009; Table 4). Table 4 
shows the performance of sub-Sahara Africa oil 
producing states on the six dimensiom of governance 
(voice and accountability, political stability, govemment 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, d e  of law and control 
of comption). Compare with the performance of non-oil 
producing but resource endowed state notably Botswana 
and Ghana, the performance of sub-Sahara Africa oil 
producing states was to say the least abysmal. The 
performance of Botswana on the governance dmensions 
and it continued impressive growth and sustainable 
human development which is predicated on p~udent 
management of diamond rents hghlighted the impedance 
of virile imtitutions in avoiding the resource curse 
dilemma. 
Beating the curse of oil: policy options: Although, the 
blight of resource curse continues to afflict Gulf of Guinea 
oil states however, experience of nations that have 
successfully institute accountable and tramparent fiscal 
measures in resource rent management have also 
highlighted the fact that resources in themselves are 
not a curse. As argued by Mehlum et a1 (2005), it is the 
non-existence or at best the weakness of political 
institutions that give rise to the curse associated with oil 
and other natural resources. Given Angola's turbulent 
path to statehood and its decades of war the task of 
cultivating virile and stable govemance institutions in 
post-war context has been an arduous task. It is the 
d e h  of and non-institutionalization of political and 
governance imtitutions that has given rise to most of the 
crisis associated with resource wealth management and 
general governance crisis in post-war Angola. 
The problem has in turn been compounded by the 
lack of political will on the paJt of the d i n g  MPLA leaders 
to make a clear break with shady practices that dominate 
oil and damond wealth management in the decades of 
conflict. Thus, the crisis of govemance in Angola llke it 
sisters oil producing states in the Gulf of Guinea d d  not 
arise from the presence of resource wealth, rather the root 
of governance crisis in the Gulf of Guinea oil states is 
traceable to the problem of govemance imtitutions. It is 
in view of this that e f f o a  directed at strengthening 
institutiom and campaigns for tramparent and 
accountable use of oil revenue by the international 
communities and local civil society groups remaim the 
potent weapon to stem the tide of the resource curse 
plaguing oil endowed states in the sub-region. It is by 
instituting and nuluring viable governance institutiom 
that these states can break out of the resource curse 
dilemma. Given h s ,  campaign of two international 
coalitiom, the Extractive Industq Tramparency Initiative 
and the Publish What You Pay coalition becomes 
essential to effod directed at turning resource wealth into 
a tool for economic prosperity. The EITI, a coalition of 
governments, companies, civil society groups, investors 
and international organizations aims to strengthen 
govemance in resource rich countries through the 
verification and full dsclosure of company payment and 
govemment revenue kom oil, gas andmining The PWYP 
campaigm is a coalition of international and local civil 
society groups that aim at pressuring mining corporations 
to make public disclosure of their payment to national 
govemment. 
The objectives underlying the two campaigm is that 
with full disclosure of revenue from mining rents it will be 
easier for local communities and civil society groups to 
track govemment expendture and thus minimize 
comption and misappropriation of resource rents. Whle  
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EITI promoters would want to paint a good picture of the 
initiative effectiveness, the reality is that ascension to 
EITI has been turn to image laundering policy by mling 
regimes in the Gulf of Guinea oil states. Whle  full 
disclosure is a necessaq first step at stemming comption 
in resource wealth management however, it need to be 
note that govemance problem in sub-Sahara African oil 
states is not only about compt  payments but more about 
compt  use of legitimate oil revenue. 
The question then lies much on how to stop the flow 
from bemg misappropriated by ~uling elite. Aside the EITI 
and PWYP campaigm the assistance of multilateral 
financial institutions in structuring revenue flows and 
encouraging transparent management of oil rents is of 
outmost importance. The international communities in 
pahcular the G-8 countries can help the cause of 
transparency in sub-Sahara Africa oil states by pushing 
for treaty backed international regulatoIy approach that 
will forced corporate best practices and protect companies 
from retaliatoIy actiom by national govemments on 
disclosure and other policies directed at enhancing 
tramparency. 
Although, Angola has embarked on the drive to 
increase public disclosure through the ascemion to the 
United Kmgdom backed Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative and by publication of more official data relating 
to the oil industry yet little has really changed with 
regards to official corruption in the management of the oil 
industq and mis-governance of oil rents noted Witness 
and OSISA-Angola (2011). While the Angolan 
govemment has made available to the public domain more 
data on the oil sector than what obtained in the past, 
however the dsclosure also raises key transparency 
related questiom. Of utmost importance is the question of 
accuracy and reliability of the published official oil sector 
transaction information. 
The mere fact that oil sector's transactional data are 
published will not and cannot in itself enable Angolans 
and their civil society collaborators to monitor 
govemment accountability. Neither can it enable 
Angolans to scmtinize the transparent use of oil rents by 
the mling regime if the data so published cannot be relied 
upon as been the accurate picture of oil production and 
financial tramactions that it is purported to have 
described by the Angolan government its agencies and 
multinational oil and gas corporations. 
Thus, without allowing independent verification of 
published govemment oil sector data by internationally 
recognized audt firms with impeccable record of h u t  the 
task of ensuring tramparency and accountability in the 
govemance of oil sector and the management of rents 
from oil will remaim futile. Herein, lays the major 
shortcoming of the internationally backed campaign for 
transparency through the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative in sub-Sahara Africa's oil 
producing state. The task for transparency and 
accountability in the governance of the oil sector and the 
management of oil rents in sub-Sahara Africa oil states 
cannot and should not be solely focused on public 
disclosure of production and financial transaction data. 
This is because govemments and corporations public 
disclosure without submitting to independent verification 
to ascertain that what is purportedly disclosed is accurate 
will amounted to no disclosure at the long ~un .  
Thus, to emure tramparency in the management of 
oil wealth in the sub-region oil states entails mandatoIy 
disclosure of production and financial transactions data 
on the paJt of multinational corporations, national oil 
companies and other state agencies involve in the 
regulation and management of the oil industry. This aside, 
there is also the need for mandatoIy audt  and verification 
of the accuracy of oil sector transactional data their 
accessibility to the public and the strengthening of the 
capacity and capability of local civil society organizations 
to monitor on what and how well the oil rents is expended 
by the mling regimes. It is only when disclosed 
information are ascertained to be correct audited, 
accessible and what they are expended on scmtinize by 
the citizens that the crisis of compt  management of oil 
rents in Angola and the rest of sub-Sahara Africa's oil 
producing states can be mitigated. 
CONCLUSION 
Across many paJt of the developing world revenue 
from resource extraction that should have aid economic 
diversification, fuel growth and enhance state capacity to 
embark on infrastructural projects and improve service 
deliveIy continued to be mis-appropriated and mis- 
managed by mling political elite. Informed by t h ~ s  trend, 
this piece engaged in a case analysis of the crisis of 
resource rents mis-management in Angola. It hghlighted 
the continued dominance of resource extraction sector in 
the Angola economy which can be attributed to faulty 
fiscal and monetaq policies. 
It also noted the crisis of comption, patronage, rent- 
seeking, the lack of accountability and transparency and 
other governance challenges afflicting the governance of 
resource rents and the management of the national 
economy in Angola, the impacts of whch  is reflected by 
Angola poor social indices. Though, the Angola 
govemment has initiated reforms and signed on to major 
transparency initiatives yet the task of engaging the state 
and demandng accountability and tramparency by civil 
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society groups in Angola remaim daunting the study 
averred. No doubt the assistance of the international 
community is cmcial in the drive for tramparency in 
Angola and in other sub-Sahara Africa's oil producing 
states yet, experience has shown that refoms take hold 
when driven by local force. Thus, international assistance 
that strengthens the capability of local watchdog 
institutions to monitor resource utilization is of utmost 
importance. Pressure from the international community 
that encourage internal refoms and incentives that 
rewards best practices in resource wealth management 
and democratic openness by regimes is cmcial to the 
success of tramparency drive in sub-Saharan Africa's oil 
states. Much as the people of Angola need the 
pamershp assistance and supports of international 
stakeholders, yet the drive for the refoms of oil 
govemance and the general stmggle for tramparency, 
accountability and pmdency in the management of the 
Angola economy and the nation's wealth is first and 
foremost the responsibility of the people and civil society 
groups in Angola. 
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